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Background
Environmental justice is the term coined by policy analysts interested in measuring

the equity of exposure to toxic waste and pollution for citizens. The theory first gained

traction in the 1980’s with the basic argument being that facilities creating pollution and

managing hazardous waste are more likely to locate in areas with lower incomes and more
minority citizens. The underlying assumption of the theory of environmental justice is that
the voting population is not comprised of high percentages of the poor and minority

population; therefore, politicians may face fewer political obstacles in allowing facilities to
locate in areas where low-income and minority populations live. From an economic basis,

inequitable exposure could be attributed to the lower cost of land in counties with low-

income citizens. This is an example of reverse causality and could also be the case that lowincome citizens may choose to live in areas with hazardous facilities because there is a
lower cost of living and accept the risk associated with these facilities. This economic

explanation has been questioned by academics who found that only some inequity in the
location of facilities could be attributed to land cost.

This economic argument will not be explored further as this paper does not look to

study the possible inequitable placement of facilities. Instead, this paper studies the

distribution of actions taken by state and federal officials to enforce environmental law.

The reviewed literature frequently tests environmental equity by measuring if there is a

higher likelihood of a hazardous facility being located in a low income area or an area with

a greater number of minority households. The theory has developed beyond the placement

of facilities to explore environmental equity as the study of the enforcement of

environmental regulations in areas with concentrations of low income and minority
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individuals. Again, because it is hypothesized that these areas are less likely to take political
action, regulators may not ensure that federal regulations are being enforced, or may

enforce them less often. It is the goal of this paper to measure enforcement in the state of
Kentucky by county and examine whether there is a difference in the number of

enforcements based on the income or racial characteristics of the county’s population.
Environmental justice was first recognized in the federal government in an

executive order from the Clinton administration. Issued in 1994, the order requires that

agencies, “shall ensure that all programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance
that affect human health or the environment do not directly, or through contractual or

other arrangements, use criteria, methods, or practices that discriminate on the basis of

race, color, or national origin” (Executive Order 12898). While recognition that inequalities
might exist was an important first step for the environmental justice movement, the order

did little to impact the processes and practices for the placement of facilities. Instead of

acting as a guideline, the order was treated as more of a recommendation by the EPA and

other federal agencies. However, it did establish environmental justice as an issue worthy
of federal attention and would lay the groundwork for future regulation by the

Environmental Protection Agency and other departments like Health and Human Services.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the main agency with the authority

to impose and responsibility to enforce environmental justice measures at the federal level.
As a way to incorporate environmental justice into the EPA’s organizational structure and
culture, the agency introduced Plan EJ 2014. The plan focuses on making environmental

justice a core consideration for the EPA when decisions are made regarding permitting and
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enforcement. There was also attention given to increasing efforts to educate the public and
to build community-based programs that focus on environmental justice. The plan was
created in 2010 with the hope that it would be implemented and in practice by 2014.
Although Plan EJ 2014 seems to be a reasonable attempt to incorporate

environmental justice concerns into the culture and practices of the EPA, a Government
Accountability Office report on the progress of these efforts states “without additional

progress on these practices, EPA cannot assure itself, its stakeholders, and the public that it
has established a framework to effectively guide and assess its efforts to integrate

environmental justice into the fabric of the agency” (GAO, 31). Changing the culture and
everyday practices of an agency like the EPA is a difficult and complex undertaking and,
realistically, cannot be accomplished in four years, particularly with recent changes in

leadership. Plan EJ 2014 is the most comprehensive approach to come from the EPA in
addressing environmental justice; however, it seems that practices which can result in

environmental inequity might arise from more deeply imbedded patterns. The Health and
Human Services strategy is similar to Plan EJ in that it relies largely on educating and

empowering those communities that are, or would be, impacted by these facilities. Like the
EPA’s strategy, this has the problem that there may be an inherent barrier of access for
these communities where traditional programs may not reach the intended audience.
Literature Review

Academic articles in the field often come to opposing conclusions, and a great

debate exists between those who find that minorities and low income populations face a

disproportionate share of environmental damage and those who do not find that their data
3

supports such conclusions. This debate exists across studies that use location of pollution
and toxic substances as the dependent variable as well as articles that use governmental

enforcement of regulation as the dependent variable. Studies in environmental justice have
focused on a variety of concerns including: location of facilities, cleanup efforts, and

enforcement. The studies considered in this literature review all focus on the enforcement

of regulations as the main focus of analysis.

In the article, “Rush to judgment: An empirical analysis of environmental equity in

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency enforcement actions” Atlas critiques the findings and
methodology of one National Law Journal article and improves upon the authors’ methods
to recreate a study of enforcement (Atlas 2001). The National Law Journal article and the
Atlas article both focus on the EPA’s enforcement of environmental regulation in terms of
litigation and subsequent penalties. Atlas concluded that minorities were not facing

discrimination in environmental enforcement. Atlas is not the only academic to report
such; some other studies that were structured similarly to his study reported similar

results. This study helped lay the framework for further analysis of the quality of studies
finding significant results. In order to compare results across studies, one must compare

the quality of the methods employed by Atlas to other studies. This type of comparison in
the literature can lead analysts to improved models to capture the possible existence of
environmental injustice.

Bowen and Wells (2002) focus their attention on the methodological limitations that

plagued earlier environmental justice studies. Mainly, the authors report, these studies had
limited data available and suffered from an inability to use one clear geographic unit of
measurement. This issue regarding unit of analysis is discussed in further detail below
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where the author will suggest additions to the county model to improve the overall study.
As of 2002, Bowen and Wells report that, “The country's environmental justice research

requirements include vastly increased data gathering and more, better empirical research”
(Bowen & Wells, 696). While the data available to researches has come a long way from
2002, the quality of the models employed by analysts remains problematic.

Evan Ringquist is one expert in the field who has performed many time-series

studies to test various theories of environmental justice. The findings from his studies
consistently indicate that minorities do face discrimination in both the placement of

facilities as well as in governmental enforcement of regulations. Recognizing the need to
organize and make sense of the environmental justice literature, Ringquist performed a
meta-analysis of the existing studies. (Ringquist 2005). The author and his team sorted

through the literature to identify studies with reliable statistical methods to include in his

aggregated analysis. Once these studies were combined, Ringquist tested the probability of
an environmental justice study finding significant results in terms of race and income.

Ringquist states three conclusions can be drawn from the analysis, the most important

being that “race-based environmental inequities exist, and this conclusion is unaffected by
the type of risk examined, the level of aggregation employed, or the type of control

variables used in the analysis” (Ringquist, 233). After comparing over 49 studies Ringquist
comes to the conclusion that, regardless of the methods employed by the study, racial
minorities do face discrimination. Ringquist, however, does not find that the same
discrimination occurs based on economic class or income level.

Recently, a study by David Konisky (2007) reported findings opposite to that of the

Ringquist meta-analysis. Konisky found that lower income populations face a statistically
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significant level of discrimination in environmental justice, in terms of the enforcement of
federal regulations, whereas racial minorities do not. To find correlations within the data

Konisky used a negative binomial regression, using each instance of enforcement of federal

regulation as count data. For the study Konisky looked at the enforcement of the Clean Air

Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Konisky’s
use of the dependent variable of enforcement is less common in the literature, with fewer
studies focusing on governmental action. The study includes data from state-level

enforcement and provides the aggregate conclusion that state governments discriminate in
their enforcement in lower-income counties.

It is the goal of this paper to recreate the study conducted by Konisky using data

from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, altering some of the independent or control

variables included. To fit the specific characteristics of the state some variables are

dropped and more appropriate ones added to test for the possibility of environmental
inequity within the counties in terms of both EPA and state-level enforcements and
inspections.

Research Design
This study addresses the two following research questions. First, is there a

difference between Kentucky counties in the number of inspections of registered facilities

that can be significantly explained by the demographic characteristics of the county? In this
research question, the author assumes the null hypothesis that there is no difference

between counties that can be explained by the demographic make-up of the county. The
alternate hypothesis assumes that there is a significant difference in the number of
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inspections occurring between counties. Second, is there a difference in the amount of

enforcement action taken in counties based on the demographics of the county? The null

hypothesis in the study would find there is no significant difference in the enforcement of
these regulations and the alternative hypothesis that will be tested states that there is a
statistically significant, negative difference in the enforcement of regulations in low
income/high minority counties as compared to other counties.

The dependent variable in this study is a count variable of the inspections and

enforcements of federal regulations of the Clean Air Act (CAA) by Kentucky officials and by
those from the EPA. For this study “enforcement” refers to both formal and informal

notices of violation of the CAA. These dependent variables were chosen because, while the
placement of facilities may indicate former inequity, inspections and enforcement of

regulation will test the possibility of current or ongoing inequity in counties with low
incomes or high minority populations. The use of a count variable as the dependent

variable necessitates the employment of a negative binomial regression for hypothesis

testing. A negative binomial is appropriate in this case, as it was in Konisky’s study, because
the counts cannot be considered independent of one another. If an inspection or

enforcement action is taken in a county once, it can be assumed that enforcement action
has a greater likelihood to occur again in the county.

Enforcement and inspections data come from the EPA through the Environmental

Compliance History Online (ECHO) and reflect the past five years of EPA and state action in
Kentucky counties. These data come from actions taken in 2008-2013 for each facility and

are aggregated by county. The only facilities included in this study are those that have been

designated as “major” facilities by the EPA, which is defined as “active, ‘federally-
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reportable’ sources” (ECHO). Smaller facilities have not been included in this study, and are
not commonly included in the literature, because reporting of inspections and compliance
for these facilities is often sporadic and does not provide enough data to make reliable
assumptions regarding enforcement actions.

Data to account for the minority distribution within the county comes from the 2010

Census by the U.S. Census Bureau. The variable indicates the proportion of non-white
citizens within the county. This will be sufficient in this study as it is the goal to test

discrimination against minorities overall, but not necessarily to test discrimination against
specific races within the population. While other studies indicate that different ethnic

groups may face different environmental inequities (Konisky, 2013) this study looks to

gain an overall understanding of the impact on all non-white citizens. In order to measure

income, two variables are included in the model: median household income and percentage
of the population below the poverty line. It is important to include both variables because
median income could be skewed by disparities in the distribution of wealth. The variable

measuring poverty will provide a more accurate measure of the concentration of poverty
within counties.

In addition to variables indicating population income and minority status, the model

includes two variables to act as proxy measures of political capacity within the community.
It was important to include these variables in the model because the underlying theory of
environmental inequity suggests that low income/high minority communities face

discrimination because of a bureaucratic incentive to be more responsive in a community

that is more politically active (Konisky, 2013). As proxy indicators of political capacity the
8

data includes a measure of county voting behavior as well as one for the population’s

education level. The voting variable is defined as the percentage of the county’s eligible

voters who voted in the 2008 presidential election. This data was obtained from the
Kentucky State Board of Elections. The education variable indicates the percent of a

county’s population who are over the age of 25 and have at least a high school diploma or

GED equivalent. Population, in thousands, is also included as a control in the models as it is

expected that the more people present in the county the more likely an inspection and/or
enforcement will occur.

Beyond these demographic variables and political capacity variables, three

additional control variables are used in the model. One additional control included is a
variable that accounts for the number of facilities in the county, as counties with more

facilities are more likely to be regulated than counties with just a few. This variable comes
from the EPA as a count of how many facilities operate in the county that have an Air ID
and are required to comply with the CAA. This variable, along with the two variables
measuring political capacity, are variables that come from the model introduced by
Konisky’s study and their logical explanatory relationship to enforcement.

A major shortcoming acknowledged by Konisky article is the use of county as the

unit of analysis in the model. Konisky explains that, because of the mixed size of counties,

heterogeneity within counties, and lack of exact locations of facilities and populations with
particular characteristics, there are definite limitations to using county-level data. Konisky

continues with this unit of analysis, however, because that is the industry standard and the
EPA data used only exists in a county-level format. In an attempt to address issues with

county-level data, the current model includes a variable indicating whether the county is
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considered a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The final variable the model includes as a
control is a dummy variable identifying “coal counties” within the state. This variable is

included and is important to consider for a coal-producing state like Kentucky because the
large coal industry represents many jobs and a powerful lobby. It is the author’s

assumption that the existence of major coal facilities in a county could impact the

likelihood that the state will enforce the CAA. These seven explanatory variables should

create a good fit for the model in predicting the number of enforcement actions taken by

the state government. The variables explained for the models are given by the regression
equations below.

Model One: Inspections
Regression Equation

Inspections= constant + nonwhite + median income + poverty
rate + population + land area + voter turnout + education +
number of facilities + MSA + coal + error term
Model Two: Enforcement Enforcement= constant + nonwhite + median income + poverty
Regression Equation
rate + population + land area + voter turnout + education +
number of facilities + MSA + coal + inspections + error term
Results and Interpretations

The results of this study vary substantially from the literature and may provide

unique insights into environmental justice in Kentucky. Of the 120 counties in Kentucky, 78
of the counties had at least one facility with an EPA Air ID. The 42 counties that did not
have a facility are not included in the regression model, as it is illogical to expect there
would be no inspections or enforcements of facilities in these counties. The number of
inspections varies greatly, ranging from as few as one inspection to a high of 423

inspections in the last five years. The enforcement variable also varies, less so than

inspections, with one to 131 enforcements in different counties. The US Census data
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included in this study - regarding race, income, population, and education – are described
in Table One below.

Table One: Summary Statistics
Observations

Mean

Median

Standard Deviation

120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120

26.63
7.45
2.51
36,161.39
$37,922.73
21.3%
8.1%
2.2%
77.5%
60.2%
329.05

10.5
1
1
18,751
$37,648.50
19.8%
6.1%
1.7%
77.9%
61.5%
305.89

52.56
17.63
4.56
74,122.76
$10,151.65
6.9%
6.1%
1.6%
7.4%
6.9%
129.14

Inspections
Enforcements
Number of Facilities
Population
Median Income
Percent Below Poverty Line
Percent Nonwhite
Percent Hispanic
Percent High School Education
Percent Voter Turnout
Land Area (Square Miles)

As shown in the table above, enforcements and inspections have high standard

deviations due to the few counties with high counts. By looking at the medians, the

distribution of these variables is easier to discern. When running both models, the only

county observations that are included are those with at least one facility in the county. The

demographic variables appear as expected from census data, given known historical trends
and variations. The variables measuring coal and MSA are dummy variables, meaning 1 is

assigned if the county is designated a coal-producing county or an MSA, and a 0 is assigned

if not. Table Two contains the frequency counts for the two dummy variables, coal and
MSA.

Table Two: Frequencies of Dummy Variables
Coal-Producing

MSA

0
1
Coal Total
0
1

Frequency

Percent

92
28
120

76.67%
23.33%
100%

86
34

71.67%
28.33%
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MSA Total

120

100%

The first model defined inspections as the dependent variable, controlling for all the

variables described above - excluding enforcements and the size of the Hispanic or Latino
population in a community as variables to be discussed in following models. Table Three,

given below, shows the results of the negative binomial regression testing the count of
inspections while holding all other variables constant, given that there is at least one
eligible facility in the county.

Table Three: Inspections Model Results
Coefficient

Number of Facilities
Population (In Thousands)
Median Income (In Thousands)
Percent Below Poverty Line
Percent Nonwhite
Coal
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
Percent High School Education
Percent Voter Turnout
Land Area (Square Miles)
Constant
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

0.210
-0.008
0.006
7.602
0.139
-0.043
0.475
5.301
4.835
0.001
-6.536

***
***
***
***
**
**

Standard
Error
0.023
0.001
0.017
2.967
1.413
0.221
0.181
2.533
2.290
0.001
2.402

When the number of facilities in a county increases, the expected number of

inspections will significantly increase, holding all other variables constant (p<0.01). This

finding is consistent with expectations, as an increased number of facilities would require
increased inspections within the county. Another important finding in the inspections

model comes from the population predictor variable. For a one thousand person increase

in the population, there is a highly significant decrease in the number of inspections in the
county, controlling for all other variables (p<0.01). This finding is does not align with the
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beginning assumptions that a population increase would, in-turn, increase the number of
inspections in the county.

Two variables that were expected to affect the number of inspections, median

income and percentage of nonwhite citizens did not yield significant results. This indicates

that the race variable and one of the income variables did not influence the likelihood of an
inspection for the given county, holding all else constant. However, the second income
variable included in the model, representing the percent of the population below the

poverty line, is found to be a significant predictor. According to the model, a one percent

increase in the population below the poverty line will increase the number of inspections in
the county, holding all other variables constant (p<0.01). This finding is opposite of what
some of the literature suggests and could be attributed to increased efforts to reverse
environmental inequities or could suggest that environmental injustice, in terms of

inspections, does not exist in Kentucky or cannot be captured due to limitations within the
model. Possibilities for this finding and implications for future research will be discussed
further in a later section of this paper.

The two variables included in the model to gauge political participation, voter

turnout and high school education, are both moderately significant in these findings. In this
regression, a one percent increase in the number of citizens (over 25 years old) with a high
school education will result in a moderately significant increase in expected inspections,
holding all else constant (p<0.05). Similarly, a one percent increase in voter turnout will

increase the number of inspections with moderate significance, ceteris paribus (p<0.05).

These political participation variables may be capturing the bureaucratic incentives to be
more active, in CAA inspections in counties that are more politically involved.
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The variable that accounts for a MSA is also significant in this model. Counties that

contain a MSA have a highly significant relationship with the dependent variable that

increases the count of inspections as compared to those counties that do not have a MSA
(p<0.01). This is an interesting finding in comparison to the results from the population
variable and may indicate that population density could be a better predictor of CAA

inspections. The variables that account for coal and land area do not yield significant
results in the inspections model.

The second model in this study switches from a focus on inspections and instead

looks at the number of enforcements within a county in the past five years. One addition to
this model is the variable Inspections Squared. This transformed version of the inspections

variable is included because of the non-linear relationship between inspections and

enforcements. Table Four gives the discrete change values of the inspections in terms of
their relationship to the dependent variable enforcements.
Inspections
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350

Table Four: Discrete Change in Enforcements
Predicted
Enforcements
0
10.09
16.14
20.78
21.54
17.97
12.07
6.53

Predicted Enforcements for
Inspections + 1
0.08
10.16
16.19
20.81
21.55
17.98
12.07
6.53

Discrete Change
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00

As the first inspections occur it is predicted that there will be enforcement action

taken in the county. However as inspections increase the expected number of resulting
enforcements does not increase at the same rate, slowing down as more and more

inspections are conducted. This relationship provides a basic insight into the interaction
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between monitoring and penalizing facilities. After a certain point it seems, inspections

could be conducted and no enforcement is necessary due to eventual compliance with the
CAA. Another possibility for this is that inspections are being conducted on repeatedly

offending facilities but enforcement action is not taken because it has not been effective in

changing the behavior of the inspected facility. These are not the only possible explanations
for the relationship between inspections and enforcements; other factors may be
contributing to the nonlinearity of these two variables.

Table Five, below, contains the results of the negative binomial regression for the

model using enforcements as the dependent variable. Both inspections (original and

transformed) are included here with highly significant relationships with enforcement in
opposite directions.

Table Five: Enforcements Model Results
Coefficient

Inspections
Inspections Squared
Number of Facilities
Population (In Thousands)
Median Income (In Thousands)
Percent Below Poverty Line
Percent Nonwhite
Coal
Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA)
Percent High School Education
Percent Voter Turnout
Land Area (Square Miles)
Constant
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

0.018
-0.001
0.244
-0.007
0.032
5.007
-1.556
-0.904
-0.088
7.280
-3.689
.001
-5.262

***
***
***
*
***
*

Standard
Error
0.006
0.001
0.067
0.004
0.025
4.457
1.817
0.348
0.280
3.967
3.434
0.001
3.944

Like the first model, this shows a significant negative relationship between

population and the number of enforcements in a county, indicating that the number of
citizens may not translate to the number of regulatory actions for a county; however,

population size in this model is only significant if the p-value is increased to a 0.1 chance of
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error, from the 0.01 probability found in the data on inspections. Again, race does not

appear to have any kind of significant relationship with the number of enforcements of the
CAA. Also, in this enforcements model, neither measure of income appears to have a

relationship with the number of enforcements. This is unexpected, as before, because the
literature would suggest race or income may be a significant predictor of enforcement
activity. Based on this model, this is not the case for federal and state enforcement of
environmental regulations in Kentucky counties over the last five years.

One particularly interesting variable from this regression output is the dummy

variable for coal. In this model, coal has a highly significant negative relationship with

enforcements (p<0.01). This indicates that, within the parameters of this study, counties

that are identified as “coal counties” are less likely to experience enforcement of the CAA.
One possible explanation for this finding, which is not controlled for in the model, is the

consideration that coal counties have different geographic features that make EPA or state
action less likely in the county. The problem with this theory is that being a coal county is
not significantly related to inspections in the first model. If land features specific to these

counties prevented enforcement action, it would follow they should also prevent inspection
actions. An alternate explanation for the significant negative relationship between coal

counties and enforcements could be a political one. In Kentucky, the coal lobby has been

criticized as having the power to help shape regulatory legislation that impacts production
and mining jobs. There is no evidence included in this model to confirm this possible

political explanation of reduced enforcements in coal counties. Further research may

include controls for political factors within the counties in order to test if the relationship is
changed when controlling for politics.
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Both of these models were also run after changing the race variable from the

percent of nonwhite citizens in a county to the percent of Hispanic/Latino citizens in the
county, as some literature suggests there is a growing concern about environmental
inequality for Hispanic and Latino communities (Konisky 2013). The results again

indicated no significant effect on inspections or enforcements to the racial makeup of the
county.

Recommendations
The findings of this study could signal the possibility of important developments in

the topic of environmental justice. With the data available and given the models employed
by this study, it seems that environmental inequality, as defined by number of inspections
and enforcements, is not an issue among the counties of Kentucky based on their

demographic characteristics. It is impossible to say if this study reflects an improvement in
environmental equity considering there are no prior studies of the topic in the state to
provide a comparison. There are at least two possible explanations for these findings:

environmental justice has never been an issue in the state or efforts to improve equity on
the state and federal levels have been successful. It could be the case that there has not

been a problem, in Kentucky, in equal governance of the CAA in the last five years. This

finding could also indicate success in efforts to improve equity across all counties, but again
without a baseline comparison preceding this study the author cannot definitively draw
this conclusion. What can be concluded from this study is that governance, in terms of

inspections, seems to be more responsive to counties with a high percent of the population
below the poverty line. This is an encouraging finding considering the body of literature
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that would suggest that this would not be the case. The racial makeup of the county also
has no relationship with the number of inspections or enforcements in the county. This
could be because the state of Kentucky is not particularly diverse; there is little racial

variation among Kentucky counties, with most counties as predominately white, which

could explain this finding.

This study could be an indicator of a state with equitable governance of

environmental justice. To further confirm this possibility, a future study would expand

beyond the CAA and look at the enforcement of legislation like the Clean Water Act and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act across facilities in the state. Future studies of

environmental justice in Kentucky should also attempt to find controls that explain this

significant relationship of reduced enforcements in coal counties. If the relationship can be

explained by a lobbying or political variable, the state will need to consider the implications
of reduced enforcement for coal counties. There is the possibility of terrain as an

explanatory factor for some of the relationship between coal counties and governance and
future studies should look to control for this geographic difference.
Caveats

As explained before, this study does not control for terrain, which could explain the

highly significant relationship between coal production and reduced enforcements. The
author questions this possibility, however, because the number of inspections is not

affected by the presence of coal within a county. The author again must note that the

number of counties with facilities with an Air ID and regulated by the CAA is only 78,

leaving this study with a relatively small sample size. In order to draw conclusions about
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environmental justice overall in the state, this sample must be widened to include other

legislation and facilities with water IDs. This study can lay the framework for future studies
in the state and provides the hopeful possibility that governance appears to be equitable in
counties, regardless of income or race. Another common issue in environmental justice

literature that this study looks to help resolve is the problem with using county as a unit of

measurement. Often, when using counties it is difficult to interpret the data in counties that
contain a large city where the population is dense. The inclusion of the MSA variable is the
author’s attempt at controlling for this, however MSA does not account for counties with
relatively large urban areas, which could be a factor in an environmental justice study.

Future research may find that using Micropolitan Statistical Areas may help account for
cities that still contribute to population density, but are not large enough to be MSAs.
Summary

This study of environmental justice in Kentucky is only the beginning for research

on this issue. Kentucky does not appear to have an inequitable distribution of governance
activities, as indicated by inspections and enforcements, for the CAA in last five years in

terms of race. Considering income and inspections, the state and the EPA seem to be more

responsive in counties with a larger percent of the population below the poverty line. This
could be because facilities in more impoverished areas require more inspections because

the facilities are operating in a more polluting manner than other facilities in higher income

communities. However, the presence of coal in a county significantly reduces the likelihood
of a CAA enforcement in that county but it does not have a relationship with the number of
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inspections in that county. These conclusions indicate, more than anything, the need for
further study of environmental justice in the state of Kentucky.
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